November, 1928.

NOTES
THE LAW SCHOOL-The opening of the present term marks an
important year in the history of the Law School. The plans, undertaken by the Trustees and Faculty during 1927-1928, have been carried
to completion.
The University of Pennsylvania Fund, through a committee
headed by Owen J. Roberts, Esq. (Class of 1898), and through the
generosity of a group of alumni and interested members of the Philadelphia Bar, raised a fund which made possible alterations in the Law
School building to accommodate larger classes and larger faculty.
The first year class during 1927-28, even under the selective system of admission introduced that year, had to be limited to 186 due
to limited classroom space. The opening of a new classroom has now
made possible the admission of a selected class of 212, which has
been divided into two sections. Each section will thus constitute
a numerical group that can be more effectively taught by the case
system than could the large groups of former years.
Price Hall, no longer practicable for use as a general assembly
room, has been furnished with classroom desks, and so becomes available as a large classroom, capable of seating the whole first year class or
a large part of the combined second and third year classes, for auxiliary lecture courses. It will also furnish a large classroom for one
division of the first year class, in case of continued increase in first
year admissions.
The division of the first year class into sections, involving the
duplication of hours, together with the desire to introduce certain
new courses as third year electives, necessitated the enlargement of
the faculty.
This necessity was partly met by the return of Professor Francis
H. Bohlen from the Harvard Law School Faculty. Professor Bohlen
will teach the law of Torts to both sections of the first year class
and offer a research seminar in special problems in the law of Negligence, open to third year students.
Professor Francis S. Philbrick, Ph.D., LL.B., of the University
of Illinois Law School and Professor Thomas A. Larremore. M.A.,
LL.B., of the University of Kansas Law School have been added to the
faculty as Visiting Professors for the present year. Professor Philbrick, in addition to taking over the courses in second year Equity,
Conflict of Laws and Suretyship, will offer a course in Legal History.
Professor Larremore will take over one section of the first year
class in Property and Agency and introduce new courses in Persons
and Domestic Relations and Municipal Corporations. Professor Edwin R. Keedy will offer a seminar course in the Administration of the
Criminal Law and Professor Austin T. Wright in special problems of
the law of Corporations. Professor William H. Lloyd offers a new
course in Administrative Law. Robert Dechert, Esq., A.B., LL.B., will
(04)
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teach a new course in Taxation and reintroduce Insurance; William
James Macintosh, Esq., B. S. in E., LL.B., will take over the course in
Public Service Corporations.
Improved classroom and teaching conditions, increased enrollment
under a selective system of admission, an enlarged faculty and the
introduction of important additional courses, make the present year
one of special interest and importance.

STATE DECISIONS AS PRECEDENTS IN FEDERAL CASES ARISING
BY REASON OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP '1-According to the con-

stitutional provision:
"The judicial Power shall extend

to Controversies

between Citizens of different States

..

The assertion is quite frequently made that the sole purpose in giving
the federal courts jurisdiction in cases of diversity of citizenship was
to insure freedom from local bias at the trial.3 However, it would
seem that the intention was also to give security against discriminatory

legal tender acts, and against stay laws reacting unfavorably to the
nonresident. 4 And, contrary to the belief of many, the possibility of
obtaining uniformity in law by this means was discussed at the Federal Convention itself.5
'All italics in this note are the writer's.
U. S. CONSTIrTIoN, Art. III, Sec. 2.
2 ELuoT's DEBATES (2d ed. 1836)

'See James Wilsoi in

491, 492;

Hamil-

ton in the FEDERALIST, No. 8o, quoted in The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque
(1891) 4 HARv. L. REV. 311, 316; Bank of the U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
87 (U. s. 18o9) ; Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 5 Wheat. 293, 302 (U. S. 1820) ;
dissent in Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464, 481 (U. S. 1845) ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18
How. 331, 354 (U. S. 1855) ; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34, a Sup. Ct.
10, 22 (1882) ; dissent in Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461,
478, 35 Sup. Ct. 173, 177 (1915); 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTioNAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1910) Io2I; PEPPER, THE BORDEn LAND OF FEDmRAL. AND
STATE DEcisioNs (1889) 57.
Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law (191I)
45 Am. L. REV. 47, 50, discusses the reason-in the following interesting language: "The jealousy felt in each State towards the citizens of other States was
beyond doubt the moving cause for the provision, and the object was to secure
to such litigants a reasonably fair trial under a jury and judge selected by another power than the State authorities. This was a very valuable privilege to a
Puritan from New England engaged in litigation With a Pennsylvania Quaker,
or to a far-off South Carolinian claiming to recover land in New York from a
citizen thereof holding under some possessory title."
'See James Wilson in 2 ELLTOTT's DEBATES (2d ed. 1836) 491, 492; Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
HARv. L. REv. 49, 82.
By John Rutledge of South Carolina, 5 ELLIOTT's DEBATES (2d ed. 1845)
158: ". . . . the state tribunals might and ought to be left, in all cases, to decide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the-supreme national tribunal
being sufficient to secure the national rights and uniformity of judgments; that
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Apparently nothing was said in the Federal Convention about
what law was to be enforced in diversity of citizenship cases.6 In the
state conventions, however, the opinion was generally expressed that
the rules of conflict of laws would be applied,7 although the view was
also maintained that a separate body of federal law would be administered.8
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that:
"The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply."9
Considering the express wording of the act, as well as the historical background of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, an interesting problem developed whether the Supreme Court would decide
in accordance with state precedents in a case arising under that clause,
and not governed by a state statute, provided- the state precedents
did not conform to the view of the Supreme Court as to what was
just.'0 In the language so often used in this connection, would the
Court "follow," or was it "bound to follow," state decisions on common law points? During the first fifty years in which the act was in
force, it would seem that no case arose involving this point." Then, in
Swift v. Tyson 12 the Court held that it would not follow the state
decisions on a matter of commercial law.
it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the states, and
creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system." It would
seem that the fair construction of this passage is that national uniformity of
law had been discussed as one purpose of the jurisdiction by reason of diversity
of citizenship.
8 Meigs, supra note 3, at 51.
7
John Marshall so believed, 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (2d ed. 1836) 556, 557.
The same opinion was held in New Hampshire, I Ew-Ior's DEBATES (2d ed.
1836) 326. See Meigs, supra note 3, at 53.
8
James Wilson so considered, 2 Ei.uOT's DEBATES (2d ed. 1836) 491, et seq.
9 I Stat. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1926).
" The situation where the state has a statute or a constitutional provision on
the point will not be considered in this note, as it would seem to be directly
covered under any possible construction of the Judiciary Act, and therefore to
present no problem from the standpoint of logic. It is true, however, that the
Court has found it possible to decide in accordance with its own view, even
where there was a state statute in point. See PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 23.
'The point was considered in Golden v. Prince, Fed. Cas. No. 5,509 (C. C.
Pa. 1814), but the case was decided on other grounds. All of the early cases
seem to have involved the construction of state statutes or constitutions, or the
title
to real property, and therefore did not raise the point on which the later
cases turned. See 5 FED. STAT. ANN. (2d ed. 1917) 1128; 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891) § 1795, n. b.
1 16 Pet. I (U. S. 1842). In that case the Court refused to follow the
New York decisions, said to begin with Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636 (N. Y.
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Two points were presented for the consideration of the Court in
Swift v. Tyson: (r) Does the section of the JudiciaryAct previously

quoted apply, and if not, (2) Is there any other reason why the
court should regard the prior state decisions as precedents. The
solution of the first question depends on the construction of the
word "laws" in the Judiciary Act. In the light of recent discoveries
as to the history of the act in the Senate, it is very probable that
"laws" was intended to include decisions, 13 but these facts were not
known to Mr. justice Story when he wrote the opinion. Certain
it is that, at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act, the doctrine of Coke, Hale and Blackstone, that judges merely declare the law
was very prevalent, 4 and seems to have been held by Chief Justice
Marshall. 5 And, under this tenet, laws could come from the legislature only. Furthermore, it is well established that decisions are not
"laws" impairing the obligations of contracts. 6 Elsewhere in the Constitution the word seems to be used in the same sense, to include only
legislative enactments.' 7 On the other hand, the view that "laws" included both statutes and decisions was held by Attorney General Randdolph' s and by Mr. Justice Ellsworth,'9 one of the draftsmen of the
JudiciaryAct, and is supported by the decisions under the more recent
1822), as to whether a pre-existing debt was value in the case of the transfer of
a negotiable instrument. The decision seems to have been novel, although it
provoked little comment at the time. It is stated in BLAcK, LAW OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS (1912)

6r2, that the rule of Swift v. Tyson was "tacitly assumed,

and generally acted on, almost from the foundation of the government. . .
No authorities are cited, and it is difficult to believe that this is a correct statement of the effect of Swift v. Tyson.
"The section as drafted read: ". . . the Statute law of the several
States in force for the time being and their unwritten or common law now in
use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the ancient statutes
of the same or otherwise, .

.

.

shall be regarded as rules of decision..

.

This was changed to read as quoted previously, before being submitted to the
Senate, evidently in the belief that "laws" had the same meaning as the longer
phrase. Warren, supra note 4, at 86.
" Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State
and Federal Courts (91o) 4 ILL. L. REv. 533, 537.
Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. I, 46 (U. S. 1825); I CooIY, CONSTITUTiONAL LImTrATIoNS (8th ed. 1927) 183, n. 4.
"U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. io; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIrE
STATES OF AmERiCA (Annotated, Payne, 1924) 305; 6 R. C. L. 332.

'Art. VI provides that: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.

.

.

."

If "laws" as here used were intended to include

decisions, then all federal decisions, even in cases arising by reason of diversity
of citizenship, would be the supreme law of the land.
"sA. STATE PAPERS, Misc. No. 17, n. 26, Report to the House of Representatives, Dec. 27, 179o; Warren, supra note 4, at 88. Randolph considered the
application of state precedents as a temporary measure until a federal code
could be drafted.
"Sims's Lessee v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425, 457 (U. S. 1799) ; Brown v. Van
Bramm, 3 Dall. 344, 356 (U. S. 1797). In the latter case the Chief Justice concurred but wrote no opinion.
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constitutional guaranty of "equal protection of the laws." 20 Although
the matter is not one on which to speak dogmatically, it would certainly
seem that Mr. Justice Story's
decision was well warranted by the au2
thorities available to him.
The Court in Swift v. Tyson, having decided that the Judiciary
Act had no application to the case under consideration, must have
further concluded that it was not desirable to follow the state precedents for any other reason. While the cases reaching the same conclusion are very numerous, and the rule represented by the case is
now well settled, the frequent and numerous dissents 22 in similar cases
would seem to warrant a review of the various arguments advanced
by the proponents and by the enemies of the doctrine, in order to
determine whether and in what cases it should be extended. The
argument of the Court in Swift v. Tyson presupposes the existence of
a uniform body of commercial law throughout the civilized world,
and stresses the importance of having the federal courts exert their
influence upon the state courts to maintain this uniformity. Many
critics profess to know of no "general law" 23 independent of the
authority of any nation, which is uniform everywhere. 24 But it would
seem to be a perversion of Mr. Justice Story's argument to suppose
that he meant that the same law was in force everywhere. He certainly knew as well as his critics that the law of England is not the
same law as that of Pennsylvania, because no authority exists common to both places. His contention was rather that the various
laws in force in different places had the same provisions. Of course,
it has been denied that any substantial uniformity in the commercial
' See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 398, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 926 (1893). In GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 250, it is argued that the fact
that statutes were almost nonexistent in some of the states at that time shows
conclusively that the Judiciary Act was intended to apply to state decisions.
2 This conclusion is also reached in Meigs, supra note 3, at 54, 55.
The following dissents are recorded: Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (0928), Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S.349,
30 Sup. Ct. 140 (19o9),

Justices Holmes, White and McKenna; Baltimore &

Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S.368, 13 Sup. Ct. 914 (1892), Justices Fuller and
Field; Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R. R., 197 U. S.544, 25 Sup. Ct. 522
(19o4), Justices Fuller, Holmes, White and Peckham; Town of Venice v.
Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 (3875), Justices Miller, Davis and Field; Town of
Genoa v. Woodruff, 92 U. S. 502 (1875), Justices Miller, Davis and Field;
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S.182, 44 Sup. Ct. 266
(924), Justices Holmes and Brandeis concurred on grounds opposed to Swift
v. Tyson.
The phrases "general law" or "general jurisprudence" have been used in
later cases instead of the more restricted one, "commercial law."
'Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., supra note 22, at 409; 2 WILLOUG
Y, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1O38; 2 HARE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALAW (1889)
iio8; BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 12, at 613; Forepaugh v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 128 Pa. 217, 226, 18 At. 503, 504 (1889).'
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laws of the various nations exists, 25 or is even desirable,28 especially
7
Still
since it makes impossible the requisite elasticity in local law.
there is no doubt that over a long period of time the Supreme Court
under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson has exerted a powerful influence upon the states toward uniform laws on commercial subcommercial law
jects.2 8 And furthermore some writers consider the
2
to be the special province of the federal government.. 1
In applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson the Court has very
generally adopted the fiction that it has a duty to form an independent
judgment as to what the state law is. 30 Possibly the federal courts
op. cit. supra note 24, at 1113.
PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 79.

= 2 HARa,

1Ibid. 78.
'Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts (1902) 36 Am. L. REv.
498, 524; Parker, The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts
(907)

17 YALE L. J. I, 10;

WHARTON,

COMMENTARIES

ON LAW (1884) 612.

Von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence (1926)
74 U. oF PA. L. REV. 109, 270, 285, notes this as one of the reasons for the doctrine. For the view that this influence toward uniformity is contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution, see Hornblower, Conflict Between Federal and State
Decisions (188o) 14 Am. L. REV. 211, 224. The general adoption of the various
uniform acts would seem to show a desire for uniform rules on commercial
subjects which is favorable to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. Pope, The Federal Courts and a Uniform Law (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 647, 650. Some authorities profess to see a tendency toward ultimate non-uniformity. BURDICK, THE
LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) 116, 117; 1 HARE, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 448, 449; BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 613. It is argued that any
lack of uniformity is not due to Swift v. Tyson, but to Delmas v. Merchants'
Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661 (U. S. 1872), Where it was decided that the state
court was not bound by the federal decisions under the Diversity of Citizenship
Clause, contrary to the supposed view of Mr. Justice Story, as expressed in
Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 309 (U. S. 1818). Schofield, supra note 14, at
544.
The example of Swift v. Tyson is not encouraging, as the
Negotiable Instruments Law was necessary to overrule the cases of Coddington v. Bay, 20
Johns. 636 (N. Y. 1822); McBride v. Farmers' Bank, 26 N. Y. 450 (1863);
Lawrence v. Clark, 36 N. Y. 128 (1867); Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286
(1872) ; Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 438 (1875). Perhaps the advocacy by the
Supreme Court of the rule of Swift v. Tyson made possible the inclusion of that
doctrine in the Negotiable Instruments Law.
I WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 28, at 611; Street, Is There a General Cominercial Law Administered by the Courts of the United States Irrespective of
the Laws of the ParticularState in which the Court is Held (1873) 12 Am. L.
REG. (N. S.) 473, 480.
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33, 2 Sup. Ct. 10, 21 (1882) ; Eliot,
supra note 28, at 521; (1926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 31O; Independent School District v. Rew, III Fed. i (C. C. A. 8th, 29O); Washburn Mfg. Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 2O6 Fed. 116 (C. C. Mass. 1895). In B-AmC, op. cit. supra note 12, at
624, 625, it is argued that this independent judgment cannot be logically restricted to matters of general law, and that it should be based on prior state
decisions.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the dissenting opinion of Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U. S. 349, 370, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, 148 (igog), contends that the federal
courts have judicial power only to declare state law, while the state courts have
power to make state law. But does not each court make law in the class of
cases within its purview? See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 255.
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so sedulously avoid calling the law which they apply federal law, in
order to escape the appearance of transgressing the requirement of
the Judiciary Act. There is no doubt, of course, that the power of
the federal courts is coordinate with that of the state courts in this
field,"" so that it is hardly an illegal assumption of power for the
federal courts to act independently. 32 The view once expressed that
the federal court is the agent of the state when exercising jurisdiction
in diversity of citizenship cases hardly seems tenable.33
An interesting attempt to demonstrate logically the existence of
a federal common law which could be applied in cases arising by
reason of diversity of citizenship was made by Judge Shiras, who
argued that the adoption of the Constitution did not deprive the people
of the common law, and that by the Constitution the people granted
to the federal courts the power to apply the common law in cases
where they derived jurisdiction under the Constitution.3 4
In almost every other case, however, the courts and the authorities, in seeking to justify the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, give
explanations as to the expediency of applying law unhampered by the
state courts, rather than attempt to show the source of the law applied. Thus the advantage of being able to correct mistakes to be
found in the state precedents, appeals to some courts. 35 The imBut, as is pointed out in an article by von Moschzisker, supra note 28, at
29O, the federal courts certainly apply a "federal common law" in diversity of
citizenship cases. See also Trickett, The Non-Federal Law Adininistered in
Federal Courts (i9o6) 40 AM. L. REV. 81g.
3' Schofield, supra note 14, at 538, who argues that, according to the wording
of the Preamble, the grant of power was by the American people and not by the
states.
32 IHARE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 448, 449, contends that it is an assumption of power.
332 WI.LOUGHBY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 1021.
" Murray v. C. & N. W. Ry., 62 Fed. 24 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, 1894).
The
case was one of interstate commerce but the reasoning is intentionally made
broad enough to cover the cases arising by reason of diversity of citizenship, as
shown by the decisions cited. The premise that the federal power is derived
from the people is supported by M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403
(U. S. 18i9). Contra: Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. I, 8,
8 Sup. Ct. 811, 815 (1888) ; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R., 125 U. S. 555, 583, 8 Sup.

Ct. 974, 978 (1888) ; Smith v. Alabama,

-
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U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 569

(1888). All of these cases state merely that there is no federal common law.
The question was at one time a violent political one. These cases really hold
that there is no federal common law jurisdiction. King, Is There a Common
Law of the United States (i8go) 24 Am. L. REv. 322; Russell, Is There a Federal Common Law (1895) 52 ALBANY L. J. 247. In Parker, supra note 28, at
12, it is contended that the Supreme Court has in fact countenanced the adoption of the English common law as a body of rules of decision.
Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511 (U. S. 1842) ; Schofield, supra note
14, at 540, 543; Von Moschzisker, supra note 28, at 285; Pope, The En.qlish

Common Law in the United States (1910) 24 HAav. L. REV. 6, 3O. In Columbia Digger Go. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780, 785 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915), it is said:
"A federal court ought not to upset the rule thus established by the Supreme
Court of a state for the guidance of its own citizens unless, that rule is against
the very decided weight of authority."
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portance of developing a consistent body of federal precedents, 8
particularly for use in the territories,3 7 has been recognized, while, on
the other hand, the lack of these very precedents has been used as
an argument against the doctrine.38 The desirability of applying the
same law to intra-state commerce as is applied to inter-state transactions has also been used as a favorable argument. 31 The fact that
Congress has never amended the Judiciary Act so as to compel the
Court to follow the state decisions has been mentioned as showing
legislative approval. 40 There is also a41desire to give the same effect
to a state decision at law as in equity.
The rule under discussion has been deplored many times as
likely to encourage confusion in laws, 42 conflicts between the federal
4
43
fraudulent assignments of causes of action,
and state courts,

and fictitious changes of residence, 45 as well as to assist the developat 6I.

Von Moschzisker, supra note 28, at 285;

WHARTON,

op. cit. supra note 28,

op. Cit. supra note 28, at 611.
Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law (1882)
8 So. L. REv. (N. s.) 452, 459, 460. This is hardly true today, although it may
have been when written.
WHARTON,

's

' Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 378, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 918

(1892).

' 0 Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, supra note 39, at 372, 13 Sup. Ct. at
915. See the attack on this doctrine in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Field, at 399, 13 Sup. Ct. at 926.
"Schofield, supra note 14, at 54o. The effect of a state decision in equity
was, however, expressly covered by the Judiciary Act of 1792, I STAT. 276
(1792).
See also28 U. S. C. §723 (1926).
'WHARTON,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 6II. Mr. Justice Washington, in
Golden v. Prince, Fed. Cas. No. 5,5o9, at p. 543 (C. C. Pa. 1814), said: "The

injustice, as well as the absurdity of the former (the federal courts) deciding

by one rule, and the latter (the state courts) by another, would be too monstrous
to find a place in any system of government." See PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at I, et seq.

' Meigs, supra note 38, at 464; 1 HARE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 448, 449;
op. cit. supra note 3, at 77; Black, op. cit. supra note 12, at 456; dissent
in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, supra note 39, at 397, 13 Sup. Ct. at 925.
In Barber v. Pittsburg Ry., 166 U. S. 83, 17 Sup. Ct. 488 (1897), it had been
PEPPER,

possible to bring two actions of ejectment, one in the state and one in the federal court. Imagine the conflict if these were differently decided.

"Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 15 F.(2d) 5og (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Farmington v. Pillsbury,
114 U. S. 138, 5 Sup. Ct. 807 (1885) ; Little v. Giles, i8 U. S. 596, 7 Sup. Ct.
32 (1886) ; Woodside v. Ciceroni, 93 Fed. I (C. C. A. 9th, 1899) ; Irvine Co.
v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849 (C. C. S. ID. Cal. 1896). In all of these cases the assignments, if not fraudulent, were at least expressly for the purpose of giving the
federal court jurisdiction. Mills, Should Federal Courts Ignore State Laws
(9oo) 34 Air. L. REv. 51, 59; PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9. In Stewart v.
Lansing, 104 U. S. 505 (188I), it would appear from the evidence that no plain-

tiff existed.

"Meigs, supra note 38, at 482. The creation of state corporations for the
express purpose of suing in the federal courts is deplored in Mills, supra note
44, at 62. As to federal corporations for the same purpose see ibid. 64.
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ment of the very complicated and technical law of the removal of
causes. 46 The nonresident is given an advantage by being able to
choose what law is to be applied. 47 The doctrine has been criticised
on grounds personal to Mr. Justice Story,48 and to the Court,49
as an evidence of nationalization gaining recognition, 0 because of
the incovenience in its application,5 and because it requires arbitrary
distinctions." It will be noticed that in this "storm of protest" there is not a
single attack upon the logical basis of the rule. Two such have
been made, however. It has been contended that as the United
States is foreign to the states, the ordinary rule of conflict of laws
should compel the federal courts to apply the law of the place where
the contract was made.5 3 The fault is with the premise. The federal
courts are not foreign courts, but rather, in the field in question, their
jurisdiction is coordinate with that of the State.5 4 Unfortunately, however, several of the state courts, seeing the apparent disregard of the
rule of conflict of laws by the federal courts, came to decide questions
" Pope, supra note 28, at 649.
'"Mills, supra note 44, at 59; Note (196)

2 IowA L. BULL. 142; 2 HARE,
op. cit. supra note 24, at iLO9; PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 64.
"8GRAY, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 253; Meigs, Shall the State Courts Adopt
the Federal Doctrine of "General Principiesof Jurisprudence" (1889) 29 CENT.
L. J. 465, 485, 489. PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6o, argues that the entire
doctrine is based on a mere dictum of Mr. Justice Story.
"Meigs, supra note 48, at 489, says the Court considered it beneath its dignity to be guided by state decisions. And the doctrine owes its extension to the
desire of the Court in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863), to
prevent a municipality from repudiating its debts, according to the view of
Meigs, supra note 38, at 478. And PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 46, et seq.,
seems to believe that the fact that the Court in Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8
Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869) was confused and led to follow cases involving federal
questions (where the federal courts are supreme), laid the foundation for the
further disregard of state precedents.
Meigs, supra note 48, at 489.

"The Court does not have time to investigate what is the best rule, or under
the fiction to independently determine the local law. Meigs, supra note 38, at
455. See also 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1O38.
' The distinction is between state decisions dealing with real property, which
will be followed, and those dealing with personal property, which will not.
Heiskell, Conflict Between Federal and State Decisions (1882) 16 AmS. L. REv.
743, 753. The contention has been set forth that it is arbitrary to follow state
decisions construing statutes and not others, but this turns on the construction
of the Judiciary Act. BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 12, at 614.
" GRAY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 254; WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 28, at
611 ; Meigs, supra note 48, at 488.
"LONG, FEDERAL Coua'rs (3d ed. 1917) 61; Central R. R. v. New Jersey
West Line R. R., 32 N. J. Eq. 67 (i88o). Counsel admitted this in Swift v.
Tyson, supra note 12, at 10. Swift v. Tyson has been commended as saving
many complicated investigations in conflict of laws. WHARTON, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 612.
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of the law of other states as matters of "general law," instead of applying the le: loci contractus.5
The second attack is premised on the proposition that in every
Anglo-Saxon state the power of the legislature must be coextensive
with that of the judiciary. From this it is argued that, if the federal
courts can apply law of their own making in cases arising under the
Diversity of Citizenship Clause, they will be exercising judicial
power in a field where Congress has no power to legislate, and thus
the above-mentioned rule will be violated."8 It has been suggested
that Congress does in fact have power under the Commerce Clause to
provide law to be applied in cases of diversity of citizenship.57 The
correct answer would seem to be that, since the requirement that the
two powers be coextensive is derived from a study of the British
Constitution, the doctrine when transplanted to this country should
only be applied to the state and federal governments considered jointly,
and not to either of them alone, because nothing similar to our system of the distribution of power between two quasi-sovereigns was
known in England. When viewed in this manner we see at once that
the total judicial powers of the federal and state governments are
coexteusive with their total legislative powers. The judicial power
in diversity of citizenship cases has been given by the people to the
federal courts,
while the legislative power has been vested by them in
58
the states.

We have earlier considered the purpose of the Diversity of
Citizenship Clause. Certainly if the intention were only to prevent
bias, the proper measure of the law to be applied in the case of a
nonresident would be that under which a resident must litigate.59
' Meigs, supra note 3, at 68, 69, reviews the decisions.
supra note 48, at 469, 485.

See also Meigs,

ra 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1028; PEPPEa, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 8; DuER, CONsTrrUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1856) 112; Horublower,
supra note 28, at 226.
" Street, supra note 29, at 480. Counsel argued in Swift v. Tyson, supra
note 12, at 9, that the Commerce Clause would be rendered nugatory if the
federal courts were bound by the state decisions on commercial subjects. But
the power to establish federal courts does not imply the power to provide law
to be administered by them. Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 433 (U. S.
186o).
r' The reader may be misled into supposing that this is only the case under
the Judiciary Act. But even if the act were not in force, the federal courts
would be obliged to follow state statutes in order to conform to the requirement
that the judicial and legislative powers be coextensive. Were the federal
courts to disregard state statutes generally, then it could truly be said that there
is no legislative control over the judiciary in this field. Unfortunately for the
practical utility of this line of argument, the federal courts have in isolated
instances refused to follow state statutes. PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22.
The view that the judicial and legislative powers of the federal government are
not coextensive seems to be supported by a comparison of the powers of the
legislature, enumerated in Art. I, with those of the judiciary, set forth in Art.
III of the Federal Constitution.
rl PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 20.
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However, as pointed out, there were other purposes, and these may
only be served by a certain independence on the part of the federal
court. 0 And should a case of bias arise, the federal court would be
81
bound not to follow the stale decisions based upon that bias.
Comity will, however, tend to make the Court adhere to the state
62
decisions unless there is a good reason to depart from them.
Thus it is seen that the federal courts will or will not follow
the state precedents, depending upon the relative importance which
63
This, in turn,
the Court gives to the various factors in each case.
it may be stated
Thus
is determined by the subject matter involved.
with relative assurance that in a case involving the title to land the
state decisions will be followed,"4 as certainty is the predominant
object; while, on the other hand, state precedents on a question of the
5
law of ;negotiable instruments will receive slight consideration,
since the influence toward uniformity is important. Other cases
will involve other factors, and must be considered in the light of the
particular facts. 6
'Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134 (U. S. 1847); Burgess v. Seligman, 1O7
U. S. 20, 32, 2 Sup. Ct. 10, 20 (1882) ; The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque (i89i)
4 HARV. L. REv. 311, 314, 315. These cases involve the construction of state
statutes, but the reasoning applies with greater force to a case not controlled by
statute.
PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16.
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 455; PEPPER, op cit. supra note 3, at 70;

Meigs, supra note 3, at 55.

In Elmendorf v. Taylor, io Wheat. 152 (U. S.

,825), Chief Justice Marshall said: ".

.

. this court ought to adopt the same

rule, (as the state court) should we even doubt its correctness."
'The cases are collected and reviewed thoroughly in Note (191o)

58 U.

OF PA. L. REV. 222; 28 U. S. C. A. (1928) 725; 5 FED. STAT. ANN. (2d ed.
1917) 1128; BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 452, et seq.; Note (1912) 40 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 38o; 3 FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (6th ed. 1921) 477, et seq.; WILLIAMS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1927) 341; I CooIEY, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 38, n. 3, 43; SPEaAR, LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1883) 635; I RosE,
CODE OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1907) §§ 10-12; 7 R. C. L. 12; 25 C. J. 828.
' PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10, 73; DoBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1928) 570; BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 496; WILIAms, op.

cit. supra note 63, at 352, 356; SPEAR, op. cit. supra note 63, at 640; 25 C. J. 839.
" As to what are matters of "general law" see DOBIE, Op. cit. supra note 64,
at 572; PEPPER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 73; BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 626,

et seq.; WILLIA s, op. cit. supra note 63, at 344, 354; SPEAR, op. cit. supra note
63, at 651; 25 C. J. 846.
' The recent case of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., suepra note 22, turned upon whether the state
precedents as to the public policy of supporting an exclusive licensing contract,
or the view of the federal court, would be applied. The majority applied the
federal view, but the dissent wished to follow the state decisions. Usually the
federal courts have followed the state decisions as to public policy in the law of
contracts. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ry., 175 U. S. 91, 100, 20 Sup. Ct. 33,
37 (1899) ; Dooley v. Pease, i8o U. S. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. 329 (igoo); McCue v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Fed. 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o8) Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Kempton, 138 Fed. 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905) ; BLACK, op. cit. supra
note 12. at 499. It is said that national public policy is a matter of "general
law." BLACK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 650.

NOTES

Many discouraging accounts of the evils which result from the
doctrine have been written.6 7 But it must be remembered that a state
legislature may at any time compel the federal court to follow any
rule which it may desire to adopt, 68 not alone because the federal
court is required to do so by the Judiciary Act, but, as it seems to
the writer, for the more fundamental reason that this is necessary
to maintain the coextensive judicial and legislative powers in the
Union. The remedies by amending the Judiciary Act to compel consistent adherence to state decisions,6" or by making the Federal Supreme Court a national court of appeal,"0 seem too extreme to meet
with general favor.
It may of course be contended that Sweift v. Tyson is merely
"judicial legislation" which has become immutable.71 If that be the
case it is futile to search for a logical basis for the doctrine. However, as the Court does in fact balance the factors previously discussed, when deciding whether to apply the rule to a given case, it
would seem possible that this is done not to determine whether public
policy requires further judicial legislation, but rather to ascertain
whether the application of the rule is necessary to effectuate one of
the purposes of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause. If any remedy
is needed, it is the more sparing
utilization of the doctrine in cases
72
where no such necessity exists.

J. G. J.
EXEMPTION OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES FROM STATE TAX-

ATION--Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States show the latest development of the doctrine that the instrumentalities of either the federal or state government are free from
taxation by the other sovereignty. In each case the Court was
divided five to four.
op. cit. supra note 3, at 3; Meigs, supra note 38, at 464.
'Note (1903) 7 LAw NoTEs (N. Y.) 124; 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 1O38, io3g.
' Mills, supra note 44, at 68.
' It is suggested that Congress should enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court over cases arising in the state courts. Schofield, supra note
14, at 548. This would probably require a constitutional amendment. Pope,
supra note 28, at 652. The whole idea is criticized in Meigs, supra note 3, at
73, who contends that Penna. R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132
'7 PEPPER,

(19o3), and Delmas v. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661 (U. S. 1871), are opposed to it.

Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., supra note 22, at 409.
"Meigs, supra note 3, at 76; Note (1926)

4o HARV. L. REV. 31o. Heiskell,

sura note 52, at 758, 759, would have the court in each case apply the following test: Are the state decisions which we are asked to follow the result of any
local bias? If not, they should, in his view, be followed. The test is too narrow to cover the purposes of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, however.
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In Long v. Rockwood I the question before the Supreme Court
was the validity of the Massachusetts law which placed an income
tax on royalties from patents. The tax was held invalid. The majority based their decision on the grounds that the patent was the
instrument employed by Congress to carry out the powers given
to it in the Constitution, 2 that such instrumentalities could not be
taxed by the states, and that the tax on the royalty would amount to
a tax on the patent right itself. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes. 3 In no uncertain terms, he based his
dissent on the fact that a patent is not an instrumentality of the
government. That being the case, he would 4allow reasonable taxation that did not discriminate against patents.
In Panftandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi' the state of Mississippi
sued to recover a tax of three cents a gallon on gasoline sold to the
Coast Guard Fleet and the Veteran's Hospital. The tax was on the
privilege of engaging in the business of selling gasoline in the state.
The Supreme Court held that the state could not collect the tax. The
reason given was that to use the number of gallons sold the United
States as a measure of the privilege tax, was in substance and legal
effect to tax the sale, and "the necessary operation of these enactments
when so construed [was] directly to retard, impede and burden the
exertion of the United States, of its constitutional powers to operate
the fleet and hospital." The two dissenting opinions I were based on the
fact that the interference of the state tax with the government was too
remote for the application of this doctrine of exemption from state
taxation.
The doctrine as generally stated is that the means or instrumentalities, which either government employs to carry out the powers
given or reserved to it by the Constitution, shall be free from taxation
by the other government. It was first formulated by Chief Justice
Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland,7 and is founded, not on any
express provision of the Constitution, but on an implication which is
necessary to the preservation of the system of dual sovereignties which
148 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928).
2 Art. I, Sec. 8 (8).
'Other dissenting justices: Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland,
and Mr. Justice Stone.
' Mr. Justice Holmes does not expressly indicate the principle on which the
court will prevent unreasonable or discriminatory taxation. In Panhandle Oil
Co. v. Mississippi, infra note 5, he merely says "the power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits." We may infer that he had reference to
the "due process" or "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Possibly he would infer that the true basis for exempting instrumentalities from
taxation should be unreasonableness or discrimination in the tax.
548 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928).
'Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Stone, concurring; dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr.
Justice Stone, concurring.
74 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig).

NOTES

it creates. His reasoning is the foundation stone of the whole doctrine. He argued that as "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy," if the taxing power of the states could be exercised upon the
powers granted to the United States in the Constitution, it would
amount to a denial of the federal powers, and accordingly such taxation
was repugnant to the Constitution." Whatever may be thought of
the doctrine," it is a well established principle of constitutional law,
which will not likely be overturned. The important question at present is whether future decisions should extend or limit the doctrine.
The converse, that the federal government may not tax the instrumentalities of the states, is equally well settled. 10
The application of these doctrines has resulted in cases which it
seems impossible to reconcile. For example, in a case a few years
ago, the Court held that a federal tax on income received under a
contract with a state for engineering services was valid. 11 It seems
difficult to reconcile this decision with either the recent decision in
the Panhandle Oil case, or with the holding that a state tax on the
income accruing to a lessee from a lease of Indian lands is unconstitutional.12 Bearing in mind that all of the cases cannot be reconciled,
it will be interesting to see if there are any tendencies running through
the more important cases, and how these trends are manifested in the
patent and the gasoline tax cases.
The clearest cases of direct interference with the federal government by state taxation, and representative of the types of situations
in which the Court does not hesitate to apply the doctrine of exemption from taxation, are those in which the Supreme Court denied
the right of the state to tax the offices,' 3 or the obligations, 14 or the
property' 5 of the federal government.
However, the doctrine that any state tax which interferes with
the instrumentalities of the federal government is unconstitutional,
'In subsequent cases it was decided that if Congress authorized the taxation, of federal instrumentalities, the states might tax them. 2 COOLEY, TAXAnTox (4 th ed. 1924)- 1287. It might be asked how Congress can authorize an act
that is repugnant to the Constitution. The answer is that the proposition implied from the Constitution is merely that either sovereignty may not be taxed
without its consent. "But the sovereignty in whose interest the exemption exists is fully protected if it controls in respect to taxation; and it may, in its
discretion, permit its own agencies, or its own property, to be taxed by the
other." Ibid.
'See Higgins, M'Cidloch v. Maryland in Australia (i9o5) 18 HARv. L.

REv. 559.

" Collector v. Day, II Wall. 113 (U. S. 187).
'Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926).
"Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922).

'Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 6 Pet. 435 (U. S. I842).
"Weston v. The City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829).
IVari Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. I51, 6 Sup. Ct. 670 (1886).
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can not be carried to a logical conclusion.
out:

It has been well pointed

"It cannot be that a state tax which remotely affects the
efficient exercise of a federal power is for that reason alone
inhibited by the Constitution. To hold that would be to deny to
the states all power to tax persons or property. Every tax levied
by a state withdraws from the reach of federal taxation a portion of the property from which it is taken, and to that extent
diminishes the subject upon which federal taxes may be laid.
The states are, and they must ever be, coexistent with the national government. Neither may destroy the other. Hence the
federal Constitution must receive a practical construction. Its
limitations and its implied prohibitions must not be extended
so far as to destroy the necessary powers of the states, or prevent their efficient exercise." 16
On this principle the Supreme Court has allowed the states to
tax the property of railroads either created 17 by the federal government, or employed by it ;s the property of telegraph companies erected
under Act of Congress on military or postroads ;19 the property of
bridge companies erected under Act of Congress across navigable
rivers;20 and the premiums of a bonding company authorized by
2
statute to become surety on bonds required by the United States. '
In one case, property was conveyed subject to a condition that a drydock be built upon it which the United States was to have the right
to use free of charge, and which was to revert to the United States if
the land was diverted to any other use or if the drydock was unfit for
use for a period of six months. The Supreme Court held the property was taxable by the state.2" But when cases arose where in
fact the tax on the property of an instrumentality would hinder the
government, the Supreme Court refused to allow the tax.28 The
following thought seems to underlie these decisions:
. . . exemption of federal agencies from state taxation is dependent not on the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their
"Union Pac. R. R. v. Peniston, i8 Wail. 5, 30, 3, (U. S.1873).
7

Ibid.

Thomson v. Union Pac. R. R., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869).
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 96r
1888); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. I, I6 Sup. Ct. 1054
2896).
Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, I75 U. S.626, 20 Sup. Ct. 205
(ioo).
=Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Pa., 240 U. S.319, 36 Sup. Ct. 298
(ig96).
'Baltimore
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S.375, 25
Sup. Ct. 50 (904).
' Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 12 (923);
United States v. Coghlan, 262 Fed. 425 (D. C. Md. I929).
'

NOTES

constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but on
the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the
tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does it hinder the
efficient exercise of their power." 24
The Supreme Court has held that the states cannot tax the incorporeal right received from the federal government, 5 or the income from it 26 on the ground that taxing the income was in effect
taxing the right. However, a recent case allowed an income tax on
money received under a contract with the state.2 7 The same reasoning
that the tax on the income was in effect a tax on the contract did not
prevent the result reached. The tax was allowed because in fact
it only remotely affected the exercise of the power to make the
contract.
These cases seem to indicate that the Supreme Court is influenced by the closeness of the connection between the government
and the alleged instrumentality claiming exemption from taxation;
and by the effect of the tax on that connection. These are both questions of fact. In some of the cases 28 the connection is close and the
effect on the government is direct, and the Court rules against taxation as a matter of law. In other cases 29 the connection is less clear
and the Court considers whether as a matter of fact the tax is an unreasonable interference with the government.
In Long v. Rockwood and Panhandle Oil Co. v.Mississippi the
majority emphasized the fact that the taxes did interfere with the
activities of the federal government-and did not consider the seriousness or reasonableness of the interference. The minority 30 refused to
condemn these taxes, because the interference was at most very remote, and not unreasonable.
The connection does not seem close between the government and
a man who procures a patent for private profit, who requires the
government to pay for the patented article, and who may secure the
"&Union Pac. R.R. v.Peniston, supra note 16, at 36.
' California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. I, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1887);
Choctaw & Gulf R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27 (1914).
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra note 12.
Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra note ii.
Supra notes 13-15.
' Supra notes 17-22.
'It is interesting to note that although the only question that had to be
decided in the patent case was that the tax on income from a patent isvalid,
Mr. Justice Holmes went a step farther and argued that a state might reason-

ably tax the patent itself. This view seems consistent with the thought that the
question of exemption should rest on actual fact of interference. However, the
decisions of the state courts are contra: Celotex Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 165 La. 195, II5 So. 457 (1928) ; People ex reL Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417, 51 N. E. 269 (1898) ; Westinghouse Electric
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioners, 151 Pa. 265, 24 Atl. 11o7 (1892).
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patent for the sole reason of keeping another person from it. An
income tax on royalties from a patent will have only a remote effect
on the encouragement and promotion of "the progress of science
and the useful arts," which is the reason for granting a patent.
A dealer in gasoline, who is connected with the federal government merely by happening to be its vendor, can hardly be called an
instrumentality of that government. In the last analysis the privilege
tax on the dealer in gasoline will only remotely affect the Coast Guard
Fleet and Veteran's Hospital for the effect will be the same as other
state taxes, admittedly valid, which increase the cost of gasoline.
Furthermore the tax is not unreasonable nor discriminatory.
Since the real reason for the doctrine that the instrumentalities
6f the federal government may not be taxed by the states, and vice
versa, is to insure the self-preservation of the governments, the
position of the dissent seems sounder in the principal cases. It would
seem that the proper investigation is whether the tax substantially interferes with the efficient exercise of government functions, or
whether the interference is in fact remote. For unless there is a
real interference, or the tax is unreasonable or discriminatory, there is
no need to apply the doctrine in order to preserve the government.
S. B.C.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF CORPORATIONs-In

OF STATE TAXES ON THE GROSS INCOME

the recent decision in Quaker City Cab Co.

v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the United States Supreme Court
holds that a tax, levied under the provisions of a Pennsylvania Statute 2
upon the gross receipts from intra-state business of a corporation engaged in the operation of taxicabs, is unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, because individuals and partnerships engaged in the
same business are not similarly taxed. This holding reverses the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by which the tax was
upheld as a franchise tax properly levied under the power of the state
to classify for taxation purposes.3
The majority of the Court, although recognizing the existence of
that power, considers this to be an improper exercise thereof. Its
position is that a corporation is a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and as such entitled to equal laws with natural
persons.' It admits that corporations enjoy special privileges and
'48 Sup. Ct. 553 (1928). Dissenting, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone.
, Act of June I, 1889, P. L. 42o, § 23, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 20388.
'Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth, 287 Pa. I6I, 134 Atl. 404 (1926).
" Cf. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287 (igo) ; Kentucky Finance Co. v. Paramount Exch., 262 U. S. 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 636 (r920).

NOTES

may be more heavily taxed for that reason, and that gross income
may be used as a measure thereof. However, it argues that the
corporations involved in this case, are already subject to a capital
stock franchise tax, and therefore there is no reason for considering
this anything other than a tax on gross income. It decides that as
such, since the tax could be equally well applied to natural persons,
it is not based on a reasonable classification.
The dissent is in three separate opinions. Its tenor is that as
corporations enjoy unusual privileges, any tax levied upon them
may be considered as a tax on those privileges and for that reason
any classification distinguishing between corporations on the one
hand and partnerships and individuals on the other, is justified.
The power of the state governments to classify for taxation purposes has been well established since the decision in Ho"M Insurance
Co. v. New York.' In grouping or selecting the objects of taxation
under this power, the only restriction laid thereon has been that the
classification be not arbitrary, but reasonsable under the circumstances
and based upon some real difference in the situation or character of
the objects taxed.( The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
were not intended to compel the states to adopt an "iron rule" of
taxation and so long as the classification be within reasonable limits
it does not violate them.7 Nor is exact quality of taxation required
thereby, but merely that the law imposing it operate on all alike
under the same circumstances."
Under this power, states have taxed the property of telephone
companies exempting from the operation of the tax those companies
doing a business of less than five hundred dollars per annum, 9 have
levied a license fee upon the operation of hand laundries exempting
those employing not more than two women operatives, ° have taxed the
production of certain liquors exempting others,11 have taxed the
12
production and refining of oil without taxing other businesses,
have taxed sugar refineries exempting those operated by planters, 3
134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593 (89o).
Magoun v. Illinois Bank, 170 U. S. 283, I8 Sup. Ct. 594 (1898) ; St. Louis

Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99 (1914) ; see Louisville Gas Co. v.
Coleman, 48 Sup. Ct. 423 (1928).
"Bells Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 1o Sup. Ct. 745 (I889);
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Auditor i65 U. S. i94, 7 Sup. Ct. 305 (897);
Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 30 Sup. Ct. 578 (igIo).
'Magoun v. Illinois Bank, supra note 6; Michigan R. R. v. Powers, 2oi
U. S. 245, 26 Sup. Ct. 459 (i9o6) ; Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S.
140, 31 Sup. Ct. 7I (1gI1) ; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct.
526 (1922).

9 Citizens' Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 33 Sup. Ct. 833 (1913).
10 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192 (1911).
U Brown-Foreman Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 7.
"Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (igio).
"American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43

(19oo).
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and have discriminated as regards the rate of taxation on inheritances
as between those in different classes of relationship with the deceased.14 These represent but a few examples of discriminations
which have been allowed as being a proper exercise of the classification power, although in each instance attacked as being a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 15
Corporations have not only been subject to differences in taxation due to the exercise of this power, but, being creatures of the
state, have also had heavier burdens resulting from the taxation by
the states of the corporate franchise, or privilege of doing business. 16
These taxes have usually been laid in the form of capital stock taxes
in the case of domestic corporations and as taxes on the value of corporate funds employed within the taxing jurisdiction in the case of
foreign corporations, but net income 17 has also been considered a
proper basis for the determination of the amount of such taxes, and
there would seem to be no essential difference between such taxes
and one based on gross receipts.' 8 These taxes although levied
upon corporations in addition to the usual taxes also levied upon individuals, do not on that account amount to unconstitutional double
taxation for they are properly to be regarded as a tax upon the
privileges accompanying the doing of business in the corporate form.' 9
In the case of foreign corporations, since the state need not admit
them in the first instance, it has been held that such taxes, even
though at a higher rate than imposed upon domestic corporations,
are valid. 20 Corporations are therefore regularly subjected to a
higher burden of taxation than is the case with individuals 1 without
the taxes so imposed necessarily amounting to violations of the equal
protection clause.
In the case of taxation by the federal government, corporations
have likewise been differently classified from natural persons and
made subject to heavier rates. These taxes were justified as a proper
14

Magoun v. Illinois Bank, supra note 6.
'In
Savannah Ry. v. Savannah, 198 U. S. 392, 25 Sup. Ct. 667 (1905), a
municipal tax upon lines of an electric railway engaged in transportation of
freight and passengers within the city was upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment although steam railroads operating a similar freight service were not
taxed. And in Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. 57
(1885), a classification of all railroad property into a separate assessment
group was upheld.
18 Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U. S. 594 (1867).
'7 Cf. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (191o). This
case involved the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Federal
Corporation Tax Act of igog.
I Cf. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.

S.

576, 34 Sup. Ct. 372 (1914) ; Spreckles

Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 376 (19o3).

" Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra note 17.

Kansas City R. R. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. IIs, 37 Sup. Ct. 58 (I916).
Note 5 to dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in the principal case, supra
note i.
2

NOTES

exercise of the classification power, being excise taxes upon the
privilege of doing business in the corporate form,22 although it is questionable whether they were not in fact income taxes under the latter
guise. Since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, however, the
federal government has had power to levy taxes upon incomes, and
the necessity for holding all such taxes to be excises has disappeared.
In some cases the federal courts have looked more closely
at the practical operation of taxing statutes 23 and if it thereby appeared that the tax was not one peculiarly applicable to corporations it
was not sustained when applied to them alone. An early decision in
which the Court adopted this attitude, and which is used as the basis
of the present decision, was that in the Railroad Tax Cases24 in
which a statute of California allowing a deduction from the assessed
value of all real property of the amount of any mortgage indebtedness
outstanding against it in the case of all land except that owned by railroad companies was held to deny the equal protection of the laws and
not to be a valid exercise of the classification power. No basis
existed in those cases, however, upon which to predicate the theory
that the righer rate of tax resulting to railroad companies amounted
to a franchise tax. Aside from these and a case arising out of the
same law in the following year 25 there have been but few instances
of the application of this doctrine.
It is ably argued in the dissenting opinion of the present case
that the principle involved differs but little from that of Flint v. StoneTracy Co., 28 arising under the Federal CorporationTax Act of i9o9.
In that case also, the contention was made that the tax was unconstitutional principally for the reason that individuals and partnerships
were not likewise subject to its terms and there as here the tax could
certainly have been levied as "conveniently" upon them as upon corporations. The argument of that case was of course based upon the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than upon the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, it was there held by way of dictum,
that even were the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable,
2
the tax must be upheldY.
The Court therein stressed explicitly the
fact that the tax although measured by net income, was really laid upon
the privilege of doing business in the corporate form with its attendant advantages, enumerating them, and advancing thereby a
strong argument for placing corporations in a class apart from individuals and partnerships.
Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra note

7; cf. HoLMEs, FEDERAL TAXES

(6th ed. 1925) 395, note 12.
'St. Louis R. R. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99 (1914).

13 Fed. 722 (C. C. Cal. 1882).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R., 18 Fed. 385 (C. C. Cal.

iMA.).
:'Supra note 17.

'Ibid. i61.
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That the states have necessarily a very broad power to classify
in taxation matters has been so consistently held, that the highest
courts of most states, as that of Pennsylvania in the present case,
have regarded it as largely unrestricted.2" Legislatures in pursuance
of that right have created numerous taxes levying heavier burdens
on corporations than upon natural persons and Congress also has
availed itself of this right to a large extent, in such laws as the
Income Tax Acts.
Hitherto the general attitude of the courts has been that almost
any tax imposed on a corporation but not on natural persons could be
attributed to the advantages of the corporate organization. In contrast
with that view, this decision represents a desirable tendency on the
part of the Court, and one which will necessarily have an important
bearing on the constitutionality of the numerous statutes in this
country taxing the income of corporations.2 9

W.E.G.
'Note (x9o3) 6o L. R. A. 321, 339.
'It has been said that the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment has
the same effect on the federal government in this regard, as does the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on that of the States.

See

Flint v. Stone-Tracy, supra note 17. On that premise it is hard in the light of

the present decision to explain the constitutionality of the federal taxes on corporate income. The Sixteenth Amendment, although granting to the federal
government the right to levy taxes upon income, does not authorize discrimination in the rate of such taxation.

